Deficit financing in developing countries: Applications and consequences by Hasan, Zubair
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Deficit financing in developing countries:
Applications and consequences
Zubair Hasan
International Center for Education in Islamic Finance, INCEIF, KL
January 2019
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/93118/
MPRA Paper No. 93118, posted 8 April 2019 03:57 UTC
1Deficit financing in developing countries:
Applications and consequences
 
Zubair Hasan, Professor Emeritus, INCEIF
Abstract
Budgetary  deficits  and  adverse  external  payments  have  emerged  as  major  public
policy  concerns  in  recent  times.  The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  discuss  briefly
various  aspects  and  forms  of  deficit  financing  modern  economies  increasingly
use to address these concerns.
     Historical evidence shows that controlled deficit  finance can be a useful tool
to  mobilize  physical  resources  for  economic  development.  Borrowings  from  the
IMF  are  available  to  meet  deficits  during  financial  turmoil  and  chronic  balance
of  payments  deficits  for  country  bailout.  The  paper  warns  of  the  dangers  of
reckless  indulgence  in  deficit  financing,  internal  or  external  -  and  indicates
precautions  to  avoid  the  pitfalls.  It  puts  presumably  for  the  first  time  deficit
finance for various purposes from different sources in a single framework.
Keywords  -  Deficit  financing,  Economic  development;  International  Monetary
Fund (IMF) conditionality; Arms race; 
Introduction
The term ‘deficit  financing’ has  wide  applications  even extending to  TV shows. 1
In  economics,  i t  connotes  the  amount  by  which  a  resource  falls  short  of  a  given
target;  indicating  most  often  a  difference  between  cash  inflows  and  outflows  or
the  shortfall  by  which  expenses  or  costs  exceed  income  or  revenues.  In  the
context  of  developing  countries  the  term  refers  to  government  budgetary
deficits. To define:
“Defici t  financing  is  a  pract ice  in  which  a  government  spends  more  money than
it  receives  as  revenue  the  difference  being  made  up  by  borrowing  or  minting
new funds”.(Bri tannica.com).
Having a  balanced  budget  -  equating  revenues  and  expenditures  of  a
government  -seems  an  ideal  fiscal  policy.  However,  even  as  socio-
economic  dynamism  may  not  usually  allow  a  perfect  synchronization  of
the  two  variables,  there  are  occasions  when  circumstances  may  force
governments  to  run  into  a  deficit.  There  are  others,  when they may find  it
1 Television deficit financing is the practice of a network or channel paying the studio that creates a show a license
fee  in  exchange  for  the  right  to  air  the  show.  For  more  information  see  Wikipedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Television_deficit_financing
2expedient  to  run  a  deficit.  This  has  been  true  with  reference  to  both
developmental effort and crisis  management.
      The  concept  of  deficit  is  not  as  simple  as  it  looks.  Various  indicators  of
deficit  in the budget may be noted,  as del ineated by Jose (2016) :
 Budget deficit =  total  expenditure – total receipts
 Revenue deficit  = revenue expenditure – revenue receipts
 Fiscal deficit = total expenditure – total  receipts except borrowings
 Primary deficit = Fiscal deficit - interest payments
 Effective  revenue  deficit  =  Revenue  deficit  –  grants  for  the  creation  of
capital   assets
 Monetized  fiscal  deficit  =  that  part  of  the  fiscal  deficit  covered  by
borrowing from the central  bank
Deficit  may  refer  to  any  one  or  more  of  the  above  versions  in  a  description
Thus,  specification is  always better  for clarity. Using the first  concept  of budget
deficit  may  especially  be  deceptive.  Take  for  instance  the  following  case  of
Pakistan  on  budget  deficit.  Notice  that  in  Figure  1  total  revenues  and
expenditures  are  not  much  different;  the  budgetary  deficit  is  small  and  fairly
uniform.  This  is  so  because  the  details  of  income  inflows  and  expenditure
outflows are not available. Debt has swollen the receipts.
A better and more revealing definit ion of  the gap is  provided by the  fiscal
deficit―total  expenditure  minus  total  receipt  excluding borrowings .  Thus,  fiscal
deficit  represents  government’s loaning from the  market  and is  the  best  measure
of the budgetary health of a country.
       Figure  1  illustrates  how  polit ical  considerations,  especially  around
elections,  force  deficit  financing  on  governments.  In  the  current  Indian  budget
presented  on  February  1,  2019  the  deficit  rises  despite  a  fall  in  estimated
  Figure  1: Fiscal defi cit of India: percent change from 
2013-14 to 2018-19
Data sources:  Centra l  Budget  
2018-19 
Auhor ’s  construct ion
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3revenues  for  providing  relief  to  the  SMEs  hit  by  demonetization  and  farmers
agitating for loan waivers. Budgets tend to underplay deficits creating problems.
      The  main  factors  that  cause  fiscal  deficit  are  the  negative  difference
between  revenue  receipts  and  public  expenditure  in  an  accounting  sense.  The
shortfall  has  an  external  component  too  ―  the  excess  of  goods  and  services
imported  (M)  over  their  exports  (X)  usually  expressed  as  (X  –  M).  A negative
(X–M)  enhances  fiscal  deficit  and  signifies  the  balance  of  payments  problem.
The government can bridge the fiscal gap from three sources:
 Mobilizing  domestic  savings  through  financial  instruments  like  bonds  or
saving  certificates.  However,  as  the  domestic  savings  pool  is  the  same  for
different  users and is  limited,  if  government  gets more,  private  enterprise  will
receive  less.  Aggregate  mobilization  and  its  impact  on  growth  may  be
inconsequential.  
 Printing  of  new  currency  notes  is  tempting  and  cheaper―unlike  bonds  no
interest  is  payable.  But  its  perils  are  no  less  than  its  attraction.  It  carries
inflationary  potential  that  may  tend  to  get  out  of  hand  worsening  income  and
wealth inequalit ies and depreciation of domestic currency.
 The  third  more  commonly  used  source  in  the  modern  era  is  to  borrow  from
abroad  from  friendly  countries  but  mostly  from  international  financial
insti tutions,  like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as Pakistan is doing. 
Rising  corruption  and  governance  inefficiencies  tend  to  raise  the  cost  of
prestigious  development  projects  over  the  years  beyond  the  financial  means  of
countries,  pushing  them  to  seek  for,  and  even  encourage,  external  capital
inflows.  Much  of  these  flows  is  short-term  and  tends  to  fly  away  with  the
slightest  signs of adversity―real or false―plunging the economy into crisis  that
snowballs.  The  economy  eventually  seeks  finance  from  the  IMF  to  cover  the
yawning  payments  deficit.  Thus,  a  nexus  is  established  between  internal  and
international payments deficit.  
This  article  is  spread  over  four  sections  including  the  introduction.  The
following  section  explains  how  deficit  financing  is  used  as  an  instrument  to
mobilize  physical  resources  for  economic  development,  citing  the  experience  of
India’s first  two five-year plans.  The discussion is then raised to the global level
showing  that  countries  falling  into  non-manageable  deficits  to  meet  their
financial  obligations  seek funds from the  IMF as  members  to  look back in  hours
of  need.  Here,  the  term  ‘conditionality’  that  has  to  be  met  for  obtaining  the
needed  assistance  is  explained.  The  nature  of  programs  falling  under
conditionality  is  discussed  and  evaluated  in  the  light  of  the  aid  recipients’
4experiences.  The  discussion  is  then  closed  with  a  few  concluding  observations
and suggestions.
Deficit financing and development experience
Interestingly, deficit  finance  can  be  used,  and was for  example  used  in  India,  as
a  tool  to  mobilize  resources  for  development  during  the  1950s. The  financial
resource  estimate  for  the  First  Five  Year  Plan  (1951-1956)  of  the  country  from
taxation  and  borrowings  at  the  centre  and  state  levels  showed  a  substantial
shortfall  from the requirements to meet  the planned growth targets.  This brought
under  consideration  the  possible  use  of  a  third  source―deficit  financing.  The
measure  was  the  direct  addition  to  gross  national  expenditure  through  budget
deficits  on  the  revenue  or  capital  account.  In  essence,  the  policy  implied
government  spending  in  excess  of  revenues  it  collected  from  taxation,  earnings
of  state  enterprises,  loans  from  the  public,  deposits  and  funds  and  other
miscellaneous sources.  The government could cover the deficit  either  by running
down  its  accumulated  balances,  or  by  borrowing  from  the  banking
system―mainly  from the  Reserve  Bank  of  India  (RBI),  the  Central  Bank  of  the
country;  thus  creating  money  as  Figure  2  demonstrates. 2  Deficit  finance  at
Rupees  2900  mill ion  provided  7.5%  of  overall  financial  outlay  (14%  of  the
public sector)  for the plan over the five-year period.
To  keep  in  check  the  inflationary  potential  of  deficit  financing  (Section  3  of
Figure  2),  operations  l ike  taxation  and  saving  schemes  were  launched  for
2 This explanation of deficit finance that the Planning Commission of India provided in paragraph 35 of the First 
Five Year document in 1951 is comprehensive, highlighting its nature possible sources, measurement and net 
outcome―that is money creation.
5mopping  up  extra  money  generated.  Price  control  and  rationing  of  essential
goods  were  put  in  place.  The  nature  was  merciful  with  monsoon  rains  for  three
consecutive  years.  Crops  were  good  putting  a  tab  on  the  prices  of  food  grains
and  raw  materials.  The  plan  achieved  its  targets  beyond  expectations.  The
economy became stable and kicking.
      The First  Five Year Plan was designated largely to agriculture irrigation and
pre-partit ion  projects’  consolidation;  the  second  (1956-1961)  aimed  on
industrialization  and  transportation,  though  agriculture  got  its  due  share.
Emphasis  on  expanding  the  public  sector  continued  in  view  of  the  declared
objective of establishing a socialistic social  order. Emboldened by the success of
the  First  Five  Year  Plan,  the  size  of  the  Second  Five  Year  Plan  in  outlay  terms
was  raised  to  Rupees  480  billion  of  which  no  less  than  Rupees  120  billion  or
25% was to be the deficit  finance component.
       The two plans  raised the GDP of the country at  constant  prices by 42% and
per  capita  income  by  18%  despite  rapid  increases  in  population.  30  years  were
also  added  to  the  life  expectancy  of  an  average  Indian.  These  were  laudable
achievements  wherein  deficit  financing  contributed  significantly  as  a  tool  for
resource mobilization.
      However,  this  merry  march  could  not  continue  due  to  massive  diversion  of
resources  from development  to  defense  after  the  1962  Chinese  attack  across  the
North-Eastern border of the country. 3
Deficit finance and inflation
Deficit  finance  is  a  double-edged  weapon  that  cuts  both  ways.  If  it  facil itates
resource  mobilization,  say  for  development,  it  can  initiate  and  fuel  inflation  as
well.  Deficit  finance  adds  to  money  supply  and  if  the  saleable  output  increases
at  slower  rate  additional  money  is  not  fully  absorbed  and  must  result  in
inflationary pressures  via  increase in  effective demand.  The situation aggravates
if  money  adds  to  speculative  activity.  To  ward  off  such  possibil ities  effort  is
made  to  pull  back  the  created  money  into  savings  through a  well-managed
system of  price  controls  and  rationing  of  wage  goods.  But  such  systems  seldom
remain  clean;  they  more  often  than  not  give  rise  to  corruption  and  black
markets.  Inflation  beyond  a  limit  alters  the  relative  price  structures  to  the
disadvantage  of  weaker  social  groups;  i t  perpetuates  income  and  wealth
3  It  was debated for some time as to why did Chinese attacked in the first instance, if  they eventually had to
withdraw voluntarily after reaching Tezpur in the Assam valley. Ayub Khan (INSERT YEAR OF REFERENCE), the
ex-president of Pakistan, provides the logic behind the action in his book Friends not masters. He thought that the
West had started comparing economic progress of democratic India with communist China. The latter attacked India
to make them spend on arms too.
6inequalities  generating  social  unrest.  Thus,  deficit  finance  has  to  be  used,  if  at
all,  with  utmost  caution.  India  was  lucky  to  contain  inflation  by  good
management  and  a  bit  of  good  luck  during  1950s.  Things  thereafter  drastically
changed  for  the  worse  on  the  price  front  during  the  Third  Five  Year  Plan  and
beyond.
Crisis management
Micro  units  can  and  do  indulge  in  deficit  financing  but  it  essentially  is  a
macroeconomic  phenomenon  strictly  falling  in  the  fiscal  policy  domain.  Keynes
(1936)  vigorously  advocated  using  deficit  financing  as  an  anti-crisis  measure
when  the  1930s  Great  Depression  peaked,  wage  rigidity  for  downward
adjustment becoming the obstacle in the way of remedial action.
In  the  1930s  crisis  deficit  finance  was  needed  to  revive  the  falling  demand  to
cheer  the  gloomy  markets;  i t  was  to  create  what  Keynes  termed  as  ‘effective
demand’.  To  this  end,  he  advocated  to  employ  people  even  to  dig  holes  in  the
ground  to  put  money  in  their  pockets  as  wage  and  to  employ  them  again  to  fill
the  same  holes  if  needed.  Thus,  it  was  deficit  financing  mostly  via  printing
money  and  was  internal  to  governance.  It  was  endogenous  to  the  country’s
macroeconomic system.
       This  changed  drastically  during  the  great  turmoil  the  subprime  crisis  of
2007  unleashed  across  countries  for  years.  The  locus  for  deficit  finance  shifted
from  revival  of  aggregate  demand  to  the  bailout  of  failing  giant  financial
insti tutions,  notably  banks,  insurance  companies  and  funds.  The  need  was
external  to  the  macroeconomic  systems.  The  economy  was  no  longer  the
recipient;  it  was  the  giver  to  the  players  of  the  financial  markets  to  save  them
from  a  total  annihilation  of  their  own  creation;  of  their  greed  and  irrational
exuberance.  Insti tutions  like  insurance  companies  and  funds―were  running  into
huge deficits to meet their liabil ities.  This deficit was met by public funds.
        A  study  by  the  Government  Accountability  Office  (GAO)  puts  the  2008
financial  crisis  cost  to  the  U.S.  economy at  more  than  US$22 trill ion  (Melendez
20113).  It  further  observes  that  the  crisis  was  associated  with  not  only  a  steep
decline  in  output  but  also  with  the  most  severe  economic  downturn  since  the
Great  Depression  of  the  1930s.  The  Agency  said  the  financial  crisis  toll  on
economic  output  may  be  as  much  as  US$13  tri llion  ―an  entire  year's  gross
domestic  product  of  the  US  economy.  Furthermore,  paper  wealth  lost  by  U.S.
homeowners  totaled  US$9.1  bill ion  while  economic  losses  associated  with
increased mortgage foreclosures and higher unemployment since 2008 need to be
considered as additional costs (Melendez,  2013).
7        How  the  crisis  affected  the  Islamic  financial  insti tutions  is  a  moot  point
even  as  an  IMF  survey  (2010)  lauds  Islamic  banks  as  being  ‘More  Resilient  to
Crisis’.  Indeed,  the  l iterature  is  full  of  praises  for  Islamic  finance  on  that  count
ascribing  the  achievement  to  two  factors:  Islamic  finance  maintains  i ts  links
with  real  economic  activities  and  is  based  on  the  principle  of  risk  sharing.  The
claim  of  observed  immunity  might  have  elements  of  truth  but  it  probably  is
being  over  stretched.  It  has  been  shown  elsewhere  that  some  Islamic  banks  and
financial  insti tutions  did  come  to  grief  during  the  crisis  and  that  the  crisis
overtook  them  indirectly  through  its  depressing  impact  on  macroeconomic
variables―savings,  investment  and  output―across  countries  (Hasan,  2016).
Thus, one must take the superiority claims with a grain of salt.
Deficit country bailout
So  far  we  have  discussed  the use  of  deficit  finance  by  a  country  between  its
government  and  economic  entities  for  development  or  for  crisis  management.
However,  a  much  bigger  drama  of  deficit  finance  is  staged  between  a  country
and  the  international  community  operating  through  the  IMF  which  has  been
established  for  helping  member  countries  out  of  financial  deficits,  if  they  land
in,  by  granting  loans  under  a  program governed  by  the  terms  contained  in  what
is popularly known as conditionality .  Earlier, it  has been shown that the need for
borrowing  is  linked  to  the  rising  costs  of  monumental  projects  and  the
ballooning  funds  the  crisis  management  needs.  Both  costs  are  largely  self-
inflicted, natural calamities occasionally contributing.
        Whatever  be  the  reason,  in  essence  the  country  is  not  able  to  escape
default  on  i ts  external  commitments  and  liabilit ies  unless  helped  to  overcome
the  impasse.  The  last  source  for  succor  in  such  cases  is  the  IMF.  The  help
seekers are usually the developing countries while the funds the IMF provides to
bridge  the  deficit  come  from  the  developed  countries,  the  institution  acting  as
their  collective  mahajan.  IMF  bailout  loans  are  no  charity;  they  are  to  be
reimbursed in the common pool so that others in need could be helped.
        The conditions IMF imposes are t ight. So tight at  times that they may make
the  patient  bleed  white.  The  IMF Greece  bailout  is  a  case  in  point.  The  pending
case  is  of  Pakistan  who  has  approached  the  Fund  for  help  under  compelling
economic  circumstance.  The  country  is  neck-deep  in  foreign  debt  substantially
related to China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) involving US$60 billion of
Chinese  investment.  Political  economy seems  clouding  the  matter  (Rana,  2018).
The  IMF  has  asked  Pakistan  to  be  transparent  in  revealing  the  details  of  the
Chinese (and other) debt before Pakistan’s application to bridge the deficit could
8be  considered  to  which  the  country  has  agreed.  Interestingly,  China  insists  that
the  term of  their  debt  to  Pakistan  must  be  fairly  evaluated.  Politics  apart,  let  us
have  a  brief  look  at  the  manner  the  IMF conducts  i ts  bailout  business  and  what
repercussions i t has on the borrowing nation, if  experience is a guide.
(i)  The IMF Conditionality
When a country approaches  the IMF for  help,  its  government  agrees to  adjust  its
economic  policies  to  overcome  the  problems  that  led  it  to  seek  financial
assistance from the international community. The terms on which the IMF agrees
to  financially  help  a  country  in  trouble  are  collectively  called  the  IMF
conditionality .
       The  IMF conditionality  broadly  consists  of  two  parts:  (i)  the  design  of  its
support  programs  and  (ii)  the  tools  for  monitoring  the  progress  of  program
implementation.  In principle,  the programs are designed in consultation with the
country  seeking  help.  They  essentially  aim  at  resolving  the  balance  of  payment
deficit  problems  of  the  country  avoiding  measures  harmful  to  national  or
international  prosperity. The  monitoring  measures  at  the  same time  oversee  that
the  resources  the  IMF  commits  to  help  the  country  remain  safe.  The  essence  of
conditionality  is  to  help  resolve  the  country’s  problems  such  that  it  is  in  a
position to repay the IMF loan.
       To reiterate,  the  member  country  seeking  help  has  primary  responsibil ity
for  selecting,  designing,  and  implementing  the  policies  that  will  make  the  IMF-
supported  program  successful.  The  program  is  described  in  a  letter  of
intent  (which  often  has  a memorandum  of  economic  and  financial
policies)   at tached  to  it.  The  program’s  objectives  and  policies  depend  on  the
country’s  circumstances.  But  the  overarching  goal  is  always  to  restore  and
maintain  the  balance  of  payments’  viabili ty  and  macroeconomic  stability  while
sett ing  the  stage  for  sustained,  high-quality  growth  and,  in  low-income
countries, for reducing poverty. 4
      For  ensuring progress in  program implementation and to  mitigate  risk to the
IMF’ provided  resources,  the  loan  granted  is  released  in  installments  linked  to
demonstrable  policy  pursuit.  The  progress  is  reported  to  the  IMF  Executive
Board  for  review to  see  if  the  program is  on  course  or  modifications  are  needed
4
 Apparent ly this  looked fai r  but  the  borrowing country  had to  so frame the program as  
would ensure a  safe  return  of  the IMF loan.
9for  achieving  the  prescribed  objectives.  The  review  approvals  are  based  on
various policy commitments agreed with the country authorities. 5
)ii (Program evaluation
A typical  IMF  program  focuses  on  correcting  the  balance  of  payment  problems
of a  country seeking a  bailout.  Its  main  components  are  devaluation of  domestic
currency,  liberalization  of  trade  and  expansion  of  the  private  sector.  The  three
elements are assumed as mutually compatible and each supportive of others.
       Currencies  of  developing  countries  are  mostly  over-valued  relative  to  the
IMF  based  parit ies. 6  The  depreciating  currencies  of  help  seeking  countries  bear
testimony to  this  statement. 7  The  assumptions  supportive  of  devaluation  are  that
the  act  would  make domestic  goods  cheaper  for  the  foreigners  boosting  exports,
and  imports  costl ier  reducing  their  inflows.  This  combined  with  liberal  trade
policy  would  help  correct  the  adverse  balance  of  payments  the  borrowing
countries  suffer  from.  Since  public  enterprises  lack  motivation,  are  prone  to
corruption  and  slow  to  act,  encouragement  to  privatization  of  the  economy  may
be  an  added  advantage  for  program  implementation.  The  question  is  how  valid
are these assumptions?
        The  catch  in  this  argumentation  is  that  i t  ignores  the  issue  of  export  and
import  elasticity.  Most  developing  economies  are  exporters  of  primary  products
where  price  elasticity  is  generally  less  than  one.  To  get  the  same  revenue  as
before,  the  country  must  export  more  in  physical  terms  than  before.  This  apart,
would  they  always  have  an  exportable  surplus  ready  at  hand?  Imports  of  these
countries are even less price elastic. They import food grains to feed the teaming
millions,  machinery  and  spares  for  their  upcoming  industries  and  technical
knowhow. They  cannot  cut  down  much  on  such  survival  needs.  Devaluation  for
them ipso  facto  means―continue  imports  at  the  same,  even  increased,  level  and
pay  more.  Debt  servicing  also  becomes  costl ier. Corruption  is  not  the  monopoly
of the public  sector. The private  sector  across the globe is  showing itself  no less
corrupt,  if  not  more;  what  caused  the  2007 subprime  debacle  and what  followed
5
  For detai ls  see  IMF Condi t ional i ty  March 6,  2018:  
ht tps: / /www.imf.org/en/About /Factsheets /Sheets /2016/08/02/21/28/IMF-Condit ional i ty
6  In fact, most developing countries find it advantageous to keep if they can their currencies over-valued as their
exports are not usually price elastic; they get imports cheaper for defense and development.
7 Note  that  the  depreciation  of  a  currency  is  not  the  same  thing  as  its  devaluation.  Depreciation  is  a  market
phenomenon  where  a  currency  depreciates  relative  to  some  others.  Devaluation  is  the  reduction  in  official
equivalence in gold at the IMF. Thus, two currencies cannot depreciate relative to one another but both can devalue
together at the IMF. 
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in  its  wake  is  evidence.  Thus,  the  IMF  bailout  programs  may  not  always  or
entirely prove conducive or helpful to the seekers.
        In  the  year  1966,  the  currencies  of  34  countries,  mostly  developing,  went
down  on  their  knees  under  IMF  programs.  The  Indian  rupee  was  one  of  them;
35% being  the  devaluation.  The  University  Grants  Commission  (UGC)  the  same
year  organized,  probably  under  government  instructions,  a  seminar  at  Meerut
entitled  ‘Foreign  Aid  in  our  Plans’.  One  of  the  specified  topics  was  devaluation
and  foreign  aid.  The  above  arguments  were  then  outlined  by  the  author  in  his
paper  on  the  topic.  Later  developments  vindicated  the  position  taken.  Food
grains  imports  created  payment  problems  as  the  Americans  expressed  their
inabili ty  to  export  wheat  to  India  and  the  USSR had  to  help  the  country  out  of
the predicament with a wheat loan.
           The  episode  also  brought  to  the  fore  another  danger  of  the  devaluation-led
bailout.  Many  developing  countries  start  manufacturing  products  such  as
automobiles  having  a  certain  percentage  of  imported  components.  This
percentage  is  gradually  substituted  with  local  makes  until  one  looks  back  with
satisfaction  that  a  t iny  fraction  of  the  product  is  now  imported.  Many  such
industries  find  them  at  the  sea,  as  India  experienced,  if  that  crucial  fraction
becomes unavailable due to the IMF program or its  cost becomes prohibitive due
to  devaluation.  Billions  worth  of  plant  investment  stands  still ,  rather  hostage  to
foreign dictates.
              More  recent  is  the  story  of  two  countries  dealing  with  financial  crisis  of
1997-98―both  instructive  and  interesting.  It  was  the  massive  short-term
Western  capital  flight  from  South-East  Asia  that  had  then  hit  the  flourishing
economies of the region.  Originating from Thailand, the contagion spread fast  to
other  nations  including  Malaysia  even  as  her  economic  fundamentals―contrary
to  the  IMF  assessment―were  sound.  Anyway,  Thailand  sought  relief  from  the
IMF  while  Malaysia  eventually  took  a  different  route―  it  resorted  to  the
imposition of exchange controls (Hasan, 2002).
       In  a  small  open  economy  like  Malaysia,  the  flight  of  short-term  capital
during  the  1997-98  crisis  led  to  a  sequence  of  events  involving  the  sell ing  of
shares  by  foreigners  in  the  stock  market  and  taking  the  sale  proceeds  to  the
currency market for  buying the US dollars to be taken out, the process leading to
a down turn in both the markets as Figure 3 demonstrates.  
     The  run  on  the  Ringgit,  the  Malaysian  currency, led  to  a  rapid  depreciation
(35%)  in  its  value  vis-à-vis  the  US  dollar  in  months.  Action  had  to  be  taken  to
stem  the  rot.  For  some  time  the  country  experimented  with  raising  the  interest
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rates  to  arrest  capital  fl ight  but  it  did  not  work.  Eventually,  Mahathir
Muhammad, the astute Prime Minister of Malaysia who knew that there nothing
was wrong with the country’s economy, took the monumental  decision to impose
exchange  controls  rather  than  go  to  the  IMF  for  bailout,  despite  internal
dissensions.
The exchange rate was stabilized at  RM3.8 to US$1. The events unfolding in 
subsequent months vindicated the validity of his decision. 8
        Malaysia  came  out  of  the  turmoil  unscathed  and  faster  than  others  in  the
region.  The  Economic  and  Social  Survey  of  Asia  and  the  Pacific  of  the  UN
(2001)  declared:  “The  experience  of  Malaysia  suggests  that  capital  controls  can
help stabilize an otherwise difficult  situation”.  The IMF now envisages imposing
fewer conditions  on loans  granted to  developing countries so that  they may have
greater  freedom  to  design  their  recovery  plans  in  the  future.     The  IMF  made
this announcement later in March 2013.
        In  contrast,  after  paying  the  last  installment  of  the  IMF  loan  in  2013  the
Thailand Prime Minister vowed to never seek IMF bailout  in future. 9  The lament
of the prime minister was not without reason. The IMF conditionality framework
has  some  inbuilt  difficulties  for  the  borrowers.  The  important  ones  are  as
follows.
8  The  present  author had  then  suggested a  package of  measures  involving exchange control  to
remedy the s i tuat ion in  a  seminar at  the  IIUM (June 1997)  when the cr is is  was in  the making.  
He later  defended the act ion against  cr i t icism.  See Hasan (2003).
9 Thaksin made the declaration on the national TV on August 1, 2003 after the last installment of debt to the IMF 
had been cleared two years ahead of time. 
<https://assassinationthaksin.wordpress.com/2013/03/24/thaksinomics-the-hero-of-thailands-financial-
crisis-or-populous-madness>/
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 Reduce borrowing, increase taxes and cut expenditure.
 Raise interest  rate to stabilize the currency
 Let failing firms liquidate
 Init iate  structural  changes  including  increased  privatization,  deregulation
and  reduction  in  corruption  as  well  as  in  official  delays  in  decision
making.
The  difficulty  is  that  these  conditions  not  only  betray  an  ideological  bias, 1 0  the
insistence  on  structural  adjustment  and  the  macroeconomic  interventions  they
require  often  make the  situation  worse for  the  recipient  country, not  better. This
was  the  experience  not  only  of  Thailand  but  also  of  Indonesia  and  other  aid
receivers  during the 1997 crisis.  As a  result  of enforcing tight  monetary regimes
pursuant  to  the  IMF  conditions  purportedly  meant  to  reduce  budget  deficit  and
stabilize  currency,  problems  aggravated.  Contrary  to  their  objectives  the
enforcement  tended to  slow down growth and spread unemployment  in  the  aided
countries.  What  happened  on  the  exchange  rate  front?  Even  as  the  IMF  aid
programs’  conditions  have  not  understandably  remained  unchanged  over  time
and  space  the  departure  in  the  case  of  Kenya  concerning  the  rate  of  exchange
during  the  1990s  is  of  interest.  The  IMF  made  the  central  bank  of  the  country
remove  all  restrictions  to  allow  a  fee  flow  of  capital  in  or  out  of  the  country.
The crit ics  validly argue that  the decision went  against  the country as  it  allowed
the polit icians to take their  ill-gotten money out of the country. 11
(iv)  Demonstration effect and arms race
The vital question is: why do developing economies fall  into external debt traps?
Some reasons  are  obvious.  There  is  a  demonstration  effect.  Expanding  means  of
transportation  and  communication,  especially  the  internet  resources  and  global
advertising,  have  really  converted  the  planet  earth  into  a  global  village.  The
living  standards  and  material  affluence  of  the  West  coming  into  observation  of
people and leaders  in  developing economies awaken in them the urge to  copy. In
their  eagerness  to  imitate,  the  society  is  more  and  more  divided  into  haves  and
have-nots.  A sizeable  and  expanding  upper  class  is  created  through  corrupt  and
exploitative  practices  to  finance  lavish  living.  Foreign  loans  taken  in  the  name
of development  projects  in  part  land in  Swiss or Panama accounts of leaders and
the  affluent.  Can this  all  be  stopped so  that  money  is  spent  where  it  is  meant  to
10 The free market advocates criticize the IMF for the interventionist component in its relief program and demand
that the institution should not interfere in the free  play of demand and supply even in foreign exchange markets.
Liberalization may especially be damaging in the least developed economies.
11
  For more case studies in an interesting evaluation of the IMF conditionality programs see the comprehensive
research article of Kampamba (2012). 
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be  spent?  Imran  Khan  the  new  Prime  Minister  of  Pakistan  is  trying  to  do  it  for
building  a  Muslim  country  of  his  vision.  Either  he  will  soon  give  up  or  will
achieve a miracle over time.
        There  is  a  wider  and more  sinister  angle  to  the  developed  and  developing
economies  divide  in  the  world―the bloody wars―there  is  a  chain  from Vietnam
to Afghanistan.
 Flourishing  economies  have  been  destroyed  on  the  whims  and  imaginary  fears
of  the  powerful  to  attain  more  power.  Arms  trade  is  the  most  lucrative  of  all
businesses;  it  values  profit,  not  blood.  A mere  look  at  Figure  4  will  make  one
understand the economics of war vis-à-vis peace.
       Modern  warfare  is  also  a  major  contributor  to  international  pollution.  As
per  estimates released by the Council  on Foreign Relations (CFR), in 2016 alone
the US administration rained at  least  26,171 bombs on seven different  countries,
averaging three an hour every day, every month,  over the year. The figures,  says
the report,  are  relatively conservative,  meaning the number of bombs dropped in
2016 could  have been much higher. The report  concludes  that  there  was no legal
validity  for  this  action  save  stretching  the  interpretation  of  an  old  authorization
for  the  use  of  military  force.  Further,  the  US  admits  that  costly  wars  are
responsible  for  the  current  economic  troubles  of  the  US,  not  the  trade  with
Beijing. 1 2  
       Thus,  so long as wars―hot or cold―continue to fuel the armament industry
the  distinction  between  developed  and  developing  economies  will  continue.  The
12 Former French Prime Minister Dominique de Ville pin, speaking at the Global Leadership Forum organized by
Sri Sri Ravi Shankar’s Art of Living Foundation, said, ‘Military intervention is stupid, war on terrorism is stupid.
The global leadership has been wrong in responding to Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Mali.’ He said that the world
needs new weapons of peace and not weapons of war (Times of India 13 March 2016
     10 Top exporters      10 Top importers
      Figure 4: Leading exporters and imports of arms in 2015 
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desire  of  the  less  privileged  to  “catch  up  with  them”  will  continue  creating
deficits providing business to the IMF, the world money lender.   
Concluding remarks
Pettifor  Ann  in  a  brill iant  article  (2019)  projects  her  views  on  deficit  financing
in  a  Keynesian/monetarist  framework.  However  her  write  up  does  not  cover  the
various  aspects  of  deficit  financing  relevant  to  developing  economies
characterized  with  the  imperfections  of  markets,  especially  financial.  Her
theoretical  prescriptions  are  not  being  applied  or  delivering  even  in  the
developed mature economies  of the West,  their  relevance to  emerging economies
is  all  the more l imited.  In the present paper, we have argued that a full  scale and
focused  discussion  on  deficit  financing  geared  to  developing  economies  must
cover as discussed above the following three areas:
a)  Use of deficit  financing to mobilize physical resources to promote growth
provided its inflationary potential  could be kept under control. 
b) Use  of  deficit  financing  to  fight  recession  in  the  Keynesian  vein  where
rigidity  of  wages  to  downward  adjustment  and  fear  psychosis  of
entrepreneurs is the inference. 
c) IMF bailouts:  The  country  is  heavily  indebted  to  outsiders,  its  balance  of
payments  posit ion  is  precarious  and no  internal  solution  is  available  as  is
presently the case of Pakistan.  In such situations,  the country seeks succor
from outside,  especially  through the  borrowings  from the  IMF and what  it
brings in its train.
In  the  first  two  cases  the  solution  via  deficit  financing  is  internal  to  the
domestic economic system; in the last  it  is external. 
      Islamic  economists  naturally  want  to  look at  modern  developments  from an
Islamic  perspective.  Deficit  financing  is  no  exception.  Thus,  Ahmad  (2019,  79)
argues  that  from a religious  viewpoint  deficit  financing must  be avoided both  in
normal  functioning  of  the  government  and  during  recessions.  In  either  case,  he
advocates  reliance  on  Zakah  payments  and  taxation  to  meet  current  expenditure
deficiencies  and  on  sukuk  –the  Islamic  bonds  -  to  cover  capital  shortfalls  He
does not touch upon the adequacy or operability of either measure in relation to
the current economic realities that obtain in most Muslin countries especially 
due to meager savings in Indonesia,  Pakistan and Bangladesh; deficit  could arise
despite Zakah and sukuk may not fil l  the bill  due to insufficiency of savings.
    The  Qur ān  in  Surah  Yusuf  (12:43-48)  calls  for  saving  of  the  current  surplusʾ
crop  to  fallback  to  meet  the  deficit  as  forecast  for  the  years  ahead.  Beyond  this
there  is  nothing  in  our  knowledge  that  can  be  related  to  current  practice  of
deficit  financing.  There  is  a  need  to  impart  realism  in  the  interpretation  and
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application  of  the  Shari’ah  law  (Hamaudi  2007).  We  accept  its  benefits  and
guard  against  i lls  of  deficit  financing  until  it  is  convincingly  shown  going
against the Islamic law or custom in the same way as we have accepted not a few
things  in  Islamic  banking  and  insurance  avoiding  interest,  indeterminacy  and
speculation.  Foreign  currency  though  money  can  be  bought  and  sold  as  a
different  commodity presumably treating interest as a mark-up or rental? 
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